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Abstract: This paper considers how a contribution based on Rorty’s edifying philosophy can help in the understanding of quality and its assurance in higher education. The suggestion is that if quality has an edifying purpose, then it should be seen as an ongoing process and might be aptly judged as being just ‘good enough’. I will argue for this position for it promotes democracy and thus justifies a position of belief in the liberal values and tolerance at the core of higher education’s resistance to the new ‘value for money’ imperative for surveillance of quality.





Finding quality in ‘being good enough’ conversations

In the new British higher education environment, where fees and political duplicity determine the value of education, it seems that consumers are to be told what to look out for and how to judge what is the best their money can buy. The morality of what constitutes a good purchase (for whom, under what condition and for what immediate and future purpose) is disrupted,  demoralising higher education’s  democratised values (see Nussbaum, 2010). The premise for this nihilistic vision of higher education is a notion from trade that the level of tuition fees somehow equals the value or worth of education. This economic imperative is far from reasonable and I want to propose that we look to Rorty, who sees the critical purpose of higher education as being democracy. Moreover, he warns that even if it is the best money can buy, education will fail us as a community if it takes the form of anything other than Bildung or edification, providing hope for a democratic and civil future. I will argue that it is in the nature of democracy to establish consensus in making judgements; not seeking to win or dominate (humanities or engineering; economic prudence or civic responsibility), but to find a way ‘good enough’ for us to live worthwhile lives. 
It is in this way that we build on compromise and collaborative action when we define quality assurance for educational systems, and in this sense the phrase ‘good enough’ describes what it might achieve for all participants, stripping away the hegemony of government or commerce. Unlike the early work of Harvey and Knight (1996), whose transformative model comes the closest to what I will suggest, or the more contemporary studies on defining quality by Houston (2008) and Van Kemenade et al. (2010), I am not trying to determine a model of quality, rather an approach that will lead us away from higher education quality being defined by ‘time to market’, brand equity and return on investment.  I am tempted to suggest that higher education is currently heading this way, under the metrics of management and marshalled into higher education subsidiaries by the marketing gurus from Marks and Spencer, Glaxo and similar. Rather than a model, I am looking at how, in the communities in which it has negotiated and democratic meaning, an understanding of quality can be achieved by edifying conversation. I suggest this will follow the rapid shift towards consumerism, heralded by market-determined fees and misguided marketing mumbo-jumbo such as ‘competition generally raises quality’ (Browne, 2010, p. 4). The higher education notion of quality will be captured and turned into something with a realisation outside the institution, in some form. 
In this paper there is a second usage of the phrase ‘good enough’, concerned with the philosophical observation that we never find the essence of anything outside our own practice. This neo-pragmatic stance sees the benefits of quality assurance in what it does for education, not in the reification of principles and processes at work behind a form of governance that imposes a substitute for seeking economic wellbeing. Instead of wellbeing, it promotes in its claims for the fees increase​[1]​ a measurable and deterministic form of education. While fees are the symptom of this capitalistic, money currency valuation of education, and although the current debate hands this ideology a common vocabulary to pursue its ends, this underlying ideology persists regardless of what happens immediately to fees. My own argument is based on the principles of a neo-pragmatic inter-disciplinary notion of knowledge of quality that seek to improve current understanding by understanding what is considered useful and what is rendered as adequately justified by belief and explanation.
 In my argument I discuss edifying and educative conversations. The notion of an edifying conversation is well developed by Burbules (1993). Dependent on a Gadamarian perspective, he holds that conversation adds tolerance, understanding and meaning, and we ‘speak with and listen to one another in a pedagogical communicative relation whose divergent aim is not a correct and final answer, but a heightened sense of sensitivity and understanding of other persons, and through understanding them, newly understanding ourselves’ (1993, pp. 115–16). Conversation can maintain difference whilst creating common new understanding and justification. 

A contemporary view of quality assurance





	the graduate paying rather than the state
	improving the student learning experience
	responding to diversity in the sector, for example private providers and further education colleges, and
	providing better value for money.
http://www.qaa.ac.uk/news/speeches/AnthonyMcClaran_20101120.asp

These trends have a number of features in common. They reveal a process of reifying quality assurance, even above what it assures, leading to the provision of simple metrics as consumer indicators of what matters and is worthy within education. The importance of quality education should reflect the most widely verifiable attributes of an educated public, not only those verifiable by quasi-scientific means and based on value for money, improving experience and quality information. Another feature is that the absence of notions of quality from specific communities is held to imply something meaningful acting against that to which the measurements of quality aspire, as if there were an independent test of the accuracy of quality representation relative to a pre-determined reality. For instance the QAA state on their website that it is their  “responsibility to safeguard the public interest in sound standards of higher education qualifications, and to encourage continuous improvement in the management of the quality of higher education” (QAA. How do we work).  Therein the QAA support a goal which is metaphysical and perfectionist, a gaol which is impossible to reach.  Such a position, I suggest, is intended to hold out an impossible standard so as to retain control over others by the claim that the universities have not yet reached (the albeit unobtainable) – metaphysical perfection.  that ill-defined notion of perfection (for they never can) This allows the Authority to impose their  surveillance on the universities for their, the Authority’s,  own benefit as not even the alternative of the market mechanism can be trusted to deliver perfection.
The application of good enough has superficial similarities with fit for purpose but unlike that approach where the focus is on matching definitive purposes as might be the case in manufacturing or service providers.  Education, at least in my view and that of others (e.g. Harvey and Knight, 1996 and Coughlin  and Kirchdoes, 2010) does not lead itself to such self-evident teleological goals for being transformative it is non-deterministic.  Good enough is that it fulfills what is needed now; it is not perfect but meets the expectations and judgments of the reference group. The decision are made in edifying conversation and do not have a universal application. 
What actually seems to be missing is a notion of education with values that challenges both the personal growth of the learner and the wider development of a tolerant and democratic society. Higher education’s political, moral and social discourses ought to be heard equally, not dominated by and subjugated to the hegemony of the economic. Certain forms of quality assurance are clearly part of this domination. Lomas and Ursin, (2009) review the literature on Type 1, managerial quality and Type II, collegial quality, in Finland and the UK and find that the academic staff in England suggested that they would prefer an emphasis on a conception of quality assurance ‘based on a collegial, enhancement-led approach’ (2009, p. 457). They reported, however, that quality was externally determined by government and involved supervision and control. Furthermore, what Harvey and Newton calls ‘the politics of quality’ (2004, p. 69) can be avoided neither nationally nor internationally. The UK government approach to higher education seems to be to give its populace a choice of riches or freedom, a premise I make based on the Browne Report and the subsequent rhetoric of political self-sufficiency. The temptation is clearly riches, and an educational structure with this as its focal point ceases to provide for the needs of a whole community. In this sense it deserves a market-determined quality assurance system, yet such a system would not be democratically driven but determined by the oligopolies comprised of special interest groups. These groups have an pre-determined understanding of value, worth, truth and knowledge designed to satisfy their own needs. 




The notion of conversation as a generator of knowledge of quality is not explicitly dealt with by Rorty’s but in his work we find a notion of being where the functionality of learning is best interpreted as a hermeneutic engagement with others. In this we develop an understanding through common language use that we may take as quality. Such a neo-pragmatic notion of quality does not need the classification of modes or of systemic ideas of codification, for all can be incorporated and recorded in the edifying conversation based on the justification of evidence that determines the confidence we have in the formation, while use of that knowledge on quality determines the way in which it is stored. In this way, what we consider to be meaningful is situated, meaning developed, in a specific conversation in a specific location whose applicability is then tested over time and space and its validity and reliability tested – somewhat like Wikipedia. Thus what counts as quality learning, worth being knowledge, is determined democratically through discussion aimed at achieving an unforced consensus. Moreover, what this ‘democratic process of inquiry determines is which descriptions of the human environment, natural as well as social, best enable human beings effectively to interact with it to satisfy their needs and desires’ (Elliott, 2006, p. 179).
These conversations may take a number of forms. An internal example is deliberation, for instance coming to terms with a range of information influencing one’s choice of university, to give a meaningful application. A second form is the personal dialogic form of ‘one to one’, as in mentoring, where it might take the form of rehearsing future actions, educational opportunities and careers with another individual. Finally, in our community of consumers, rather than an edifying process such conversations might involve negotiating the meaning of new forms of knowledge or validating generally accepted findings to justify an investment in gaining a job.
The terms and the symbols we use are culturally determined and act to include or exclude those without the appropriate characteristics to belong to the conversation. According to Rorty we engage in edifying discourses that seek to help others ‘break free from outworn vocabularies and attitudes, rather than to provide “grounding” for the intuitions and customs of the present’ (1979, p. 12). The cultural role of such edifying philosophy is ‘to help us avoid the self-deception which comes from believing that we know ourselves by knowing a set of objective facts’ (1979, p. 373). Taking this stance helps us describe and thus recreate our world. This is not an attempt to find an alternative objective reality with the certainty of knowledge and the robustness of the relationship for which it functions as ‘knowledge of’. Instead, this stance defines the level of confidence we can have in the inferences we make of one to the other. It assumes as a basic premise that at some level knowledge can be a non-inferential fundamental from which we can build inferential steps to a conclusion of knowing; that is, knowing the ‘facts’ revealed. Such an assumption is false, I will claim, for evidence is socially and culturally constructed and defined, not independent of things themselves. The conversation is necessarily ongoing for it is not a matter of discovering or seeking essences, but of being prepared to listen and learn from others. It also requires that we reconstruct our own world views as part of our work world with others. In so doing, we reflect upon what is our identity, both in the specific situated learning environment and beyond. We find, develop and form solidarity with a community through our choice of story, which identifies us with the wider contest of that community. Thus, as Rorty proclaims in his important work on knowledge, Solidarity or objectivity, when a person seeks solidarity, ’he or she does not ask about the relationship between the practices of the chosen community and something outside the community’ (2002, p. 422); rather, what is sought is pragmatic intersubjectivity, where what is believed works, and what is sought is something better. Knowledge then is ‘simply a compliment paid to the beliefs we think so well justified, that for the moment, no more justification is needed’ (2002, p. 425). For Rorty, knowledge is contingent upon access to a particular language game that depends on a convergence of social and historical factors determining the type of conversation taking place. As he explains, ‘if we see knowledge as a matter of conversation and of social practice, rather than as an attempt to mirror nature, we will not be likely to envisage a meta-practice which will be the critique of all possible forms of social practices’ (2002, p. 171). In other words, we need not substitute facts for interpretation. Knowledge justification democratically emerges from a community based on Socratic conversations and, ‘while uniform agreement may not necessarily ensue, no difference of opinion so intractable as to bar solidarity with one’s fellow could arise’ (Nelson, 2009, p. 500–2).
The interrelation of the idea of truth being a creation of those vocabularies forming the platform of Rorty’s pragmatism is clearly linked to Wittgenstein by Rorty’s expressive use of language games in Contingency, irony and solidarity (1989). Moreover, like language games, vocabularies are ‘useful or useless, good or bad, helpful or misleading, sensitive or coarse, and so on, but they are not “more objective” or “less objective” nor more or less “scientific”’ (1982, p. 203)

Where does this lead up to in the notion of quality’s realisation? 

First we need to recognise that quality is, as Barnett has claimed (2003, p. 38); a metaphor in higher education borrowed from it original meaning in business.  It ought  not to be literally interpreted in complex and  different context  yet it has.  Who does this benefit when education is enframed by a specific meaning which turns higher education away from its edifying purpose into sometime that can be  measurable deterministic, neo-positivistic instrumentalism and performativity?  This necessarily will lead away from democratic collaboration on what can be taken as quality, in the sense of what stakeholders to that higher education would wish (and it is for this reason that I choice a different use the metaphoric use, that of quality as an edifying conversation, seeking consensus.  By seeking consensus we can make sense of the diversity in supply and demand so confusingly articulated by government, and move away from an employment discourse designed to reinforce an economic and politically exploitative model of education. Such an approach of forced agreement is neither democratic nor fair. The literal imposition of notions of world class quality does just this, as it is unrealistic and therefore oppressive as it keeps institutions seeking something that is unachievable for almost all. In this way these unrealistic goals keep the power and direction of higher education with the government. To me at least, the imposition of consumerist notions of excellence and quality seems to have little merit and, from the perspective of our recent history of economic recession, little justification. What is needed is a better educated democratic electorate, not a better trained workforce; we need an electorate that most significantly believes in freedom, not in its exclusive desire to obtain truth and an assurance of quality.
This will not prevent wasted effort fuelled by the credo of higher quality, even if it is juxtaposed with safeguards of centralised minimum standards. This word game is self-defeating and should be abandoned before it becomes invasive and changes the worth of education itself; it should be replaced with a general notion of ‘good enough’. This is not a lowering of standards, but a realisation of how much an institution is capable. Certainly it doesn’t have the ring of a winning marketing slogan, but it does have an honesty and integrity worthy of the notion of liberal education. As Rorty suggests, the real problem for America ​– and I would extend this to the UK – has been to ‘worry about making sure that higher education was not purely vocational ​– not simply a matter of fulfilling prerequisites for professional schools or reproducing current disciplinary matrices’ (1999, p. 122). We recognise that educational activities and practices embody knowledge, and that knowledge is determined by its usefulness to engage and cope in our everyday activities. Moreover, we accept that what one knows might be transferred from the original domain of its justification into other domains. However, success depends on the ability of those whose who will use this knowledge to be able to define it as such in their own language games and accommodate it in their own realisation of meaning in ways that keep on working for them, or, as Rorty puts it, ‘we do not know what success would mean except simply “continuance”’ (1982: 172, italics in the original). The skills that facilitate this are the skills of the recipient community (or members, leaders, teachers, mentors, within it) to learn and give meaning to this new information as presented. This can be achieved through edifying conversations exploring the value of the new information as knowledge and attributing to it the values of the recipient group.
The approaches above lead to a notion of quality that does not assume an inherent attribute that, once identified, leads to an appropriate action. It holds that actions determine the notion of quality in the same way as freedoms determine the notion of democracy. Rorty evokes such a sentiment when he writes, ‘Instead of justifying democratic freedoms by reference to an account of human nature and the nature of reason, Dewey takes the desire to preserve and expand such freedoms as a starting point’ (1999, p. 119). 
These forms clearly use a pragmatic interpretation of information in the sense of beneficial consequences of what constitutes knowledge, not an epistemic justification. This is where our approach differs from others’ discussions of knowledge. In taking the pragmatic approach as supported by Rorty it requires nothing other than that which is a truth; that there is no reason to develop an epistemic notion of truth beyond the one which in works a particular context and has meaning. For Rorty there is ‘no activity called “knowing” which has a nature to be discovered, and at which natural scientists are particularly skilled. There is simply the process of justifying beliefs to audiences’ (1999, p. 36). Following this approach there is no need to construct propositions to reify the reality of the word game and then discussing the realised knowledge as applied, theoretic, Mode 1 or Mode 2. 
To be able to undertake and participate in these learning conversations, however, there are prerequisites of skills and capacities that determine whether and at what level you might be included or excluded from the language game conversations. Moreover, there is a need to understand the relationship between peers in the recipient group. Peroune (2007) has drawn attention to the levels of peer engagement based on trust and self-disclosure. These findings indicate that the willingness of participants to share tacit knowledge is enhanced when trust and willingness to self-disclose are at their highest.
If quality is regarded as edifying conversations, then judgments have to be made. However, these judgments on the value to the individual and the group of the usefulness of the knowledge and the actions to ensue are matters of practical judgment, and lead to a skilled judge being considered as a wise person. This requires of the conversationalist an ability to understand other language games so as to interpret meanings between different domains and also to challenge the interpretation of their notions of knowledge. As each domain is in constant flux, this ability to interpret, or giving meaning to something in order for it to become knowledge, is what we consider to be the main attribute of the ability to learn. For the worker in any workplace, the ability to transcend their immediate contextual interpretation of knowledge in ways that challenge the accepted interrogation is an ability to create new knowledge; new ways of being useful within the context of action. This requires many virtues and not just the Aristotelian virtues of courage – it is a risky thing to acknowledge changing ways of being – prudence and desire but, according to Winch (2008), also requires self-regarding virtues such as patience, persistence, diligence, attention to detail and tenacity. Furthermore, this ability to learn involves aretaic and personal characteristics in existing practices as putative abilities in knowledge creation.

Learning to learn: Edifying conversation and the realisation of a university

Our approach is based on what Rorty has called edifying philosophy, the ‘project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking’ (1991, p. 360) and applying this as an approach to learning and knowledge in the university. It is to conceive of learning, the ability to converse with others and to persuade them of the ability to learn how to learn. This ability to engage in knowledge acquisition and creation clearly entails a social learning process. We are conveying a powerful underlying assumption that learning is collective, constructive and conversational. It is a domain-independent model of learning, and knowledge is presented that is designed to help conceptualise and understand what takes place when effective communication occurs; the process of coming to know, when a participant in a conversation can be said to understand another participant’s ‘knowledge’. Knowledge is thus knowing with others for the purpose of coping in the world of experiences. Our decisions then determine our actions, based on what we decide and the meaning attributed to entities and actions, to our agreed notions of quality.
 It sees knowledge creation as a hermeneutic process which replaces one world view with another. For Rorty, the purpose of interpreting and knowing our world is not just to know, but to cope (2002, p. 356), that is, to exist in the world effectively and seek ways of change for improvement. This leads us not to seek truth but to evaluate ideas, regardless of their context, in ways that help us cope. As Rorty suggests, knowledge based on an essential notion of knowledge is used only to ‘criticize views that [they] take to be false… rather it is the vocabulary of practice rather than theory, of action rather than contemplation, in which one can say something useful about truth’ (1989, p. 163). 
The central issue for learning to learn, as a way for creation of knowledge, is the notion that it is not a capacity that can be nurtured – for learning is learning to learn. Instead, at Winch’s suggestion (2008), it is a disposition, a way of being, and as such it evokes a notion of praxis which, unlike poiesis, is an end itself and not a means to an end. I will suggest along with Winch that the aretaic and personal qualities of the learner may be more decisive in becoming knowledgeable and thus be in the position to create new knowledge by recognising the value in existing practices as putative abilities in knowledge.	
The emphasis on practical action as a way of being in Aristotle’s the Ethics begs the questions regarding community acts. This aspect of political advocacy is rectified in the Rhetoric, where many of the themes developed in the Ethics are re-contextualised. Here Aristotle addresses the more public and political aspects of moving people emotionally and rationally into action. Aristotle states that the ‘[D]uty of the rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us... the subjects of our deliberations are such as to seem to present us with alternative possibilities, about things that could not have been’ (1357a, pp. 2/5); a role for the practically wise. Thus rhetoric’s purpose is the art of making practical judgements on what one can believe is worthwhile knowledge, that is, not falsehood, and what is worthy of action, and communicating them convincingly, requiring an understanding of oneself and others as social, political and cultural beings (Miller, 2007).
This is an edifying discourse of the sort proposed by Rorty, an attempt to make sense of our educational experiences. The conversation is an ongoing one, since there is no final vocabulary, and no single sure way to capture the meaning. It is not a matter of discovering necessary truths or grasping unchanging essences, but of being prepared to listen and learn from others, as well as to respond and reconstruct our own views as we investigate together – ‘together’ as defined as in bordered clusters akin to communities of practice – what it means to have a certain identity and how edifying action might bring this about. This edifying therapy keeps us grounded, helping us to be the ‘good enough’ worker where we spend most of our lives, and encourages the integration of our creative, productive and growth seeking ‘self’ dimensions through a dialogic process. 

Conclusion
What is advocated here are mutually edifying quality conversations between the practitioners and beneficiaries of ‘good enough’ higher education. This mutual meaning-making is a new type of knowledge formation that is transitory, in the sense of progressively changing towards the stance one takes for oneself, and trans-disciplinary in that it is should not be beholden to any single formulated structure of knowing. It takes the form of an edifying conversation, one with intent to build academic, administrator and student autonomy with efficacy within the context of the university, which has civic responsibility. The intention is to find an interpretation that is most helpful in enabling us to act autonomously and with individual and collective purpose. These conversations take the form of a hermeneutic dialogic process involving an understanding of one’s own current position and, through this, interpreting our everyday conspicuous environment. The objective is to become familiar with the new context in which quality is considered, so that our understanding has meaning for us and for others as an edifying, not an economic, process. 
Some may argue that this already exists, conversations framed by the consumerist context of higher education, of market forces or through the stewardship of external accrediting bodies reified in the Bologna process or self-sustaining as in the USA.  However, these are not edifying conversations of Rortyan ironists but commonsensical iterative dialogues of those who have forgone pushing barriers and have settled for gently bouncing them!
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^1	  Fees are the symptom of this capitalistic, money currency valuation of education. This underlying ideology persist regardless of what immediate happen to fees. The fees argue hand this ideology a common vocabulary to pursue it ends.
